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ESTATE OF SKIFTER

V. COMMISSIONER

ESTATE TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES
HELD BY THE INSURED AS TRUSTEE
Estate of Skifter v. Commissioner'
More than three years before his death, decedent made a complete, irrevocable assignment of nine insurance policies on his life to
his wife. 2 His wife predeceased him, and under her will the policies
became part of a testamentary trust. The terms of Mrs. Skifter's
will provided that the income from the trust was to be paid to her
daughter for life, with principal to pass to such persons as her daughter
might appoint by will. In default of appointment, the principal was
to go to her daughter's living issue or, if there were none, to decedent
or, if he were not then living, to other named beneficiaries. Decedent
was named executor of his wife's estate and trustee under the trust,
with broad powers over the distribution of income. In addition, he
could terminate the trust by distributing all the principal to the income
beneficiary.2 Until he died, decedent's only act as trustee was to receive dividends from one of the policies. The proceeds of the insurance policies were not included in the decedent's gross estate in his
estate tax return.
The Commissioner determined that decedent at his death possessed "incidents of ownership" in the life insurance policies on his
life within the meaning of section 2042(2)" of the Internal Revenue
1. 72-2 U.S.
(1971).

TAX CAS.

12,893 (2d Cir. Oct. 19, 1972), aff'g 56 T.C. 1190

2. 56 T.C. at 1191. As original owner, decedent had possessed the power to
assign, surrender for cash value and borrow against the policies.
3. Mrs. Skifter's will provided:
THREE: A. I authorize my Trustee in his absolute discretion, at any time
and from time to time, to pay over the whole or any part of the principal of the
trust created by Article Two of this Will to any beneficiary entitled at the time
of such payment to the current income from the principal so paid over whether
or not any such payment shall result in the termination of the trust from which
the payment is made. . . . It is my intention that any rules of trust law which
may require impartiality as between income beneficiaries and remaindermen shall
be disregarded, and that my Trustee shall exercise the authority herein given to
him in the interests of the income beneficiaries and without regard to the interests
of the remaindermen.
56 T.C. at 1192.
Skifter, as trustee, had broad powers of management and control over the
testamentary trust. He could sell and mortgage the property as well as invest and
reinvest the proceeds. 72-2 U.S. TAX CAS.
12,893, at 8598.
4. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2042(2) provides in part:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property . . .
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES. To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the

306

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXXII

Code of 1954 and that therefore the proceeds of the policies were includible in his gross estate for estate tax purposes.5 The Tax Court,
however, held for the taxpayer, concluding that although the insured
in his fiduciary capacity had broad powers to effect changes in the
beneficial ownership of the policies or their proceeds, none of these
powers could be used for his own benefit; consequently they would
not qualify as "incidents of ownership" 6 that would require inclusion
of the policy proceeds in decedent's gross estate by reason of section
2042(2).
The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision on appeal,
holding that where powers which may not be exercised so as to benefit
the decedent are conferred upon him in his capacity as trustee the
"incidents of ownership" test of section 2042(2) is not met. The court
decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the
incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other
person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term incident of ownership
includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the
policy or other instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such
reversionary interest exceeded 5 percent of the value of the policy immediately
before the death of the decedent ....
5. The amount to be included in the gross estate where inclusion results under
§ 2042 is the full value of the proceeds payable to the beneficiary. INT. REV. CODE Of
1954, § 2042; Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a) (3) (1958). The proceeds of the policies on
Skifter's life amounted to $121,923.52. The policies had been included in Mrs. Skifter's
gross estate at a value of $20,620.32. The value was different because Mrs. Skifter
was not the insured, and the policies were therefore included in her gross estate as
property owned by her at death [see INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2033], rather than as
insurance on the life of decedent. Valuation of insurance on the life of one other than
the decedent is provided for in Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 Cum.
BULL. 417.

6. The judicial history of what is necessary to establish incidents of ownership
for inclusion in the decedent's gross estate is complex. For a detailed discussion see
2 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 17 (1959);

Comment, Incidents of Ownership Tests for Inclusion of Life Insurance Proceeds in
Decedent's Gross Estate, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 370 (1971) ; 22 VAND. L. REV. 711 (1969).

Neither complete legal nor equitable title to the policies is necessary to establish incidents of ownership. United States v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 11
(1st Cir. 1966). Nor is physical possession of the policies a requirement. Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1965) ; Estate of Piggott v. Commissioner,
340 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1965).
Courts have found incidents of ownership when the insured possessed at his
death the power (1) to alter the beneficiary under a policy, Commissioner v. Noel,
380 U.S. 678, 683 (1965); Commissioner v. Karagheusian, 233 F.2d 197 (2d Cir.
1956) ; (2) to surrender or cancel the policy, Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d
288 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853 (1950) ; (3) to borrow from the insurer against the surrender value of the policy, Fried v. Granger, 105 F. Supp. 564
(W.D. Pa. 1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1953) ; and (4) to assign the policy,
Commissioner v. Noel, 380 U.S. 678 (1965).
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concluded that Congress did not intend to tax such an arrangement
as a substitute for a testamentary disposition by the insured-decedent. 7
While the court was willing to concede that non-beneficial powers retained in connection with a transfer of the beneficial interest in the
policies might constitute incidents of ownership,8 it found that situation
to be distinguishable from Skifter, where decedent gave up all rights
in the policy and later received a grant of non-beneficial powers over
the policy in connection with a transfer in trust.
Both the Tax Court and the Second Circuit admitted the presence
of a novel question.' Neither court, however, seems to have made
adequate use of what source material was available to guide it in resolving the question. Little support can be found for their conclusion
in the statute, the Treasury regulations, or the case law.
DEFINING INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP

Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 l0 as amended by the

Revenue Act of 1942,11 the value of the decedent's gross estate included the proceeds of life insurance if (1) the proceeds were paid to
the decedent's estate, 2 (2) the decedent paid the premiums on the
policies or (3) he possessed any incidents of ownership in the policies
7. 72-2 U.S. TAX CAS.
12,893, at 8600. The purpose of section 2042 is to
defeat a means of estate tax avoidance. See H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th Cong., 2d Sess.
22 (1919). Life insurance makes such avoidance possible because it is not includible
as property owned by the decedent at death. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033
(providing for inclusion in the gross estate of property owned at death by decedent).
Since the theory of the federal estate tax is to tax transfers made at death [see notes
27-29 infra and accompanying text], the decision as to whether an arrangement is in
substance a testamentary disposition may provide a clue as to whether such arrangement is within the scope of the statute where the words of the statute are not clear.
Cf. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436, 444 (1933) (holding that the power of
Congress to tax substitutes for testamentary disposition was unquestionable).
8. 72-2 U.S. TAX CAS. 1 12,893, at 8600. The court reached this conclusion
because of its view that where powers are retained, it is fair to treat the arrangement
as a testamentary substitute. Id.
9. Id. at 8599; 56 T.C. at 1197.
10. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811(g), 53 Stat. 122 [hereinafter cited in
footnotes as Int. Rev. Code of 1939 and in text as the 1939 Code].
11. Prior to 1942, insurance was included if taken out by the decedent on his
own life. The 1942 change was made because of conflicting interpretations as to
whether incidents of ownership or premium payments was the decisive factor. See
generally 2 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §§ 17.03-04
(1959).
12. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(g) (1) (as amended by the Revenue Act of
Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, § 404, 56 Stat. 944) was reenacted without substantial change
as INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2042(1).
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at his death. If the decedent continued to pay the premiums, the policy
proceeds were included in his gross estate in proportion to the amount
he had paid, even if he had made an irrevocable assignment of the
policies on his life. Thus, once the insured began to pay premiums
on a policy on his own life, it was not possible, by giving away all
rights to and control over the policy, to remove all the proceeds from
his gross estate. It became apparent that the premium payment test provided a permanent block to reducing the amount of the gross estate. 13
Where any other type of property is concerned, a complete transfer
of all rights and control in property more than three years before decedent's death will bar inclusion of the property in his estate. Since this
discrimination against life insurance was considered to be unjustified,' 4
the premium payment provision was eliminated in the 1954 code. This
change left the incidents of ownership test as the sole determining
factor of inclusion in decedent's gross estate of policy proceeds payable to beneficiaries other than decedent's estate.
Some definition of what powers or rights are included in the term
"incidents of ownership" is provided by the regulations and the case
law.'" The specific problem which arose in Skifter was whether the
possession of powers which would qualify as incidents of ownership
if conferred by the terms of the policy, but which were conferred by a
trust instrument, will also cause the proceeds to be included in the
insured's gross estate.' 6 In holding that they would not, at least in
the case where they could not be exercised by decedent for his own
benefit, both courts were faced with the problem of reconciling Treasury
regulations 20.2042-1 (c) (2) and 20.2042-1 (c) (4) with each other.
Regulation section 20.2042-1 (c) (2) 17 provides that, in general, the
13. The insured's only alternative was to surrender the policy and receive the
cash surrender value. He could then give away the cash. However, this would cause
a sacrifice of the benefits that flow from keeping the policy until death.
14. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954, H.R.
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954).
15. See note 6 supra. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958) contains several
examples of incidents of ownership. See note 17 infra.
16. The assignment of the entire interest of decedent would normally remove the
policy proceeds from the gross estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (1) (1958). The
problem arose because of what the Tax Court termed the "fortuitous circumstance"
that Mrs. Skifter died first and named Skifter as trustee of her testamentary trust.
56 T.C. at 1197.
17. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958) provides:
For purposes of this paragraph, the term "incidents of ownership" is not limited
in its meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical legal sense.

Generally

speaking, the term has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the
economic benefits of the policy. Thus, it includes the power to change the bene-
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term "incidents of ownership" refers to the right to economic benefits, while regulation section 20.2042-1 (c) (4)1 indicates that decedent will be considered to have an incident of ownership in life insurance policies on his life held in trust if he has the power to change
the beneficial ownership and enjoyment of the proceeds even though
he may not have a beneficial interest in the trust.
The Tax Court saw the regulations as reconcilable in one of two
ways. The first alternative would be to read the introductory phrase
"generally speaking" in regulation section 20.2042-1 (c) (2) as not
meant to exclude the possibility of non-beneficial interests. If this alternative was not acceptable, then regulation section 20.2042-1 (c) (4)
must be limited to the situation where decedent retains powers under
a transfer in trust. Under this reading, a non-beneficial power is
taxable only if retained by decedent, and not where such a power is
conferred upon him by the independent actions of another person.' 9
Both courts rejected the first possibility of reconciling the regulations, reasoning that, except in the situation described by regulation
section 20.2042-1 (c) (4), section 2042 was intended to tax only beneficial interests.2" The requirement of regulation section 20.2042-1 (c)
(4) that non-beneficial powers be taxed was limited to apply only to
ficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an
assignment, to pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan
against the surrender value of the policy, etc. . . . (emphasis added).
18. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1 (c) (4) (1958) provides:
A decedent is considered to have an "incident of ownership" in an insurance policy
on his life held in trust if, under the terms of the policy, the decedent (either alone
or in conjunction with another person or persons) has the power (as trustee or
otherwise) to change the beneficial ownership in the policy or its proceeds, or
the time or manner of enjoyment thereof, even though the decedent has no
beneficial interest in the trust. . . . (emphasis added).
19. A third possible means of reconciling the section was not considered by either
court. Since Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4) (1958) is the only section which speaks
of policies "held in trust" [see note 18 supra], it might be argued that this regulation
was designed to deal with the special situation in which an insurance policy is placed
in a trust. If this construction were correct, then there would be no conflict between
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2042-1 (c) (2) and 20.2042-1(c) (4), and the Skifter case would
be governed by Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4).
20. 72-2 U.S. TAX GAs.
12,893, at 8600; 56 T.C. at 1198. The Tax Court
devoted more space to construing the regulation than did the Second Circuit, which
was content to adopt the lower court's reasoning in this regard. Id. Since the regulations, which are promulgated pursuant to statutory authority [INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 7805], are a formal explanation of the statute, it would be preferable to reconcile
them in order that they give some aid in interpreting the statute; however, if the
regulations exceeded the scope of the statute they would be invalid. See, e.g., Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129 (1936).
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powers retained in connection with a transfer of the policies. 2' Therefore, since the powers possessed by Skifter at his death were not retained powers, some power to benefit himself had to be found in order
to tax the proceeds. The power possessed by decedent as trustee was
a power to prefer the income beneficiary over the remaindermen, and
the exercise of this power could not benefit Skifter; therefore, no
inclusion resulted.
It is difficult to find support for this conclusion in the statute, the
regulations, or any available evidence of legislative intent. The statute
by its terms requires only that incidents of ownership be "possessed"
at death; in other sections in which retention of some power or interest is a condition of inclusion, specific wording to that effect is
present in the statute.22 Moreover, the examples of "incidents of
ownership" contained in the committee reports which accompanied
the statute when the term was first introduced in 1942,3 seems to be
21. The Tax Court said:
However, (c) (4) casts a cloud upon (c) (2), and we are not sure precisely what
(c) (4) was intended to achieve ....
It may be that it was intended primarily to
govern situations like the creation of a trust by the insured who transfers policies
owned by him to the trust.... And since a transfer of property generally with
reservations of powers by the transferor as trustee may be sufficient to bring
the property within the gross estate regardless of whether such powers may be
exercised for his own benefit, it would be entirely appropriate to give (c) (4) a
reading that would treat insurance in the same manner.
56 T.C. at 1198-99.
22. See, e.g., INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2036(a) (1), which causes inclusion in
the gross estate of property in which the decedent retained an income interest in
connection with an inter vivos transfer of the property.
23. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1942, H.R.
REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 164 (1942) which accompanied the 1942 statute
stated :
There is no specific enumeration of incidents of ownership, the possession of
which at death forms the basis for inclusion of insurance proceeds in the gross
estate, and it is impossible to include an exhaustive list. Examples of such
incidents are the right of the insured or his estate to the economic benefits of
the insurance, the power to change the beneficiary, the power to surrender or
cancel the policy, the power to assign it, the power to revoke an assignment, the
power to pledge the policy for a loan, or the power to obtain from the insurer a
loan against the surrender value of the policy. Incidents of ownership are not
confined to those possessed by the decedent in a technical legal sense. (emphasis added).
The language of the House Report is reiterated in S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942). The reference to the power to "change the beneficiary" would seem
to include powers over the right to the economic benefits of the insurance even if the
insured did not have the right to those benefits.
The examples of incidents of ownership listed in the House Committee report
were used as the basis for the examples given in the regulations. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958). One interesting discrepancy between the language in the
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broad enough to include any power to affect the beneficial interest
and enjoyment of the policies or proceeds thereof, regardless of whether
decedent may benefit himself through exercise of the power.24
Faced with this lack of direct authority, the Second Circuit
turned elsewhere to find support for its theory. Because of the decision made by Congress in 1954 to treat life insurance in the same
manner as other property, the court reasoned that some aid to construction of section 2042 might be found in the treatment of other

types of property under other estate tax provisions. It found the support
it needed in its construction of those other provisions.
GENERAL PATTERN

OF ESTATE TAXATION

The Second Circuit in Skifter concluded that it was the intent
of Congress in eliminating the premium payments test as a factor in
the taxation of life insurance proceeds to parallel the estate taxation
of life insurance with that of other property.2 5 From this conclusion
report and the language of the regulations may be an intentional change. In the
committee report "the right . . . to the economic benefits of the insurance" and "the
power to change the beneficiary" (which is not necessarily a beneficial power) are
both listed as separate examples of incidents of ownership. The regulations state that
"[g]enerally speaking, the term has reference to the rights of the insured . . . to the
economic benefits of the policy," and then refer to "the power to change the beneficiary"
as one of several examples which are within the meaning of the term. See Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2042-1 (c) (2) (1958) reproduced in note 17 supra. Possibly this change means
that the Treasury intended that powers such as the right to change the beneficiary,
which are not necessarily exercisable for the benefit of the holder of the power, are
within section 2042(2) only if they may be exercised for the benefit of the insured.
However, such a conclusion is difficult to reach from what may have been an unintentional change in language.
24. Support for this proposition was advanced in United States v. Rhode Island
Hosp. Trust Co., 355 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1966), wherein the court said:
Plaintiffs seize on Section 20.2042-1 (c) (2) of the Treasury Regulations on Estate
Tax, which says . . . the term 'incidents of ownership' is not limited in its
meaning to ownership of the policy in the technical legal sense. Generally speaking, the term has reference to the right of the insured or his estate to the economic
benefits of the policy. Plaintiffs urge that there must be 'a real control over
the economic benefits.' To this there are two answers. First, it is clear that the
reference to ownership in the 'technical legal sense' is not abandoned and supplanted by reference to 'economic benefits.' Second, the regulation goes on to list
illustrative powers referred to by Congress in its reports. All of these are powers
which may or may not enrich decedent's estate, but which can affect the transfer
of the policy proceeds. (emphasis added).
25. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. The theory that concepts applicable
to other estate tax sections should be used in construing the life insurance section is
worthy of closer examination than the court's statement might indicate. It is arguable
that the legislative history concerning the elimination of the premium payments test is
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the court reasoned that in construing section 2042 it should "look to
the experience under the statutory scheme governing the application
of the estate tax to other types of property.''" The Commissioner
also accepted the argument that other sections of the Code might
provide a guide to interpretation of section 2042(2); he contended
that the tax pattern established by these sections provided support
for the conclusion that incidents of ownership include the power to
affect the beneficial enjoyment of others, even though the decedent
could not benefit himself. To determine the effect of this scheme, it
is necessary to examine the language and application of the various
estate tax sections to determine exactly what powers and interests
Congress intended to include under the estate tax section of the Code.
too skimpy to support the conclusion that Congress intended that the whole body of
law regarding inclusion of other types of property under sections 2033 through 2038
be incorporated wholesale into section 2042. Only two statements are available concerning the change. The first is the statement by the committees that the change
was made because "[n]o other property is subject to estate tax where the decedent
initially purchased it and then long before his death gave away all rights to the
property and to discriminate against life insurance in this regard is not justified."
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954). The other is the explanation by
the committee of the incorporation into section 2042(2) of the section 2037 rule that
reversionary interests qualify for inclusion only if their value exceeds five percent of
the value of the property. In this respect the committee stated that "[t]o place lifeinsurance policies in an analogous position to other property, however, it is necessary
to make the 5-percent reversionary rule, applicable to other property, also applicable
to life insurance." S. R'. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1954). The Second
Circuit, while admitting that "this legislative history is hardly conclusive upon the
matter," [72-2 U.S. TAX CAS. f[ 12,893, at 8599] found additional support for the
analogy in the fact that the examples of incidents of ownership set forth in the committee reports accompanying the 1942 change were the same types of powers that
cause inclusion of other types of property under sections 2036, 2037, 2038 and 2041.
See note 23 supra.
One argument which might be made in support of the conclusion that section
2042 must be construed without reference to other sections is the argument that
life insurance is inherently testamentary. Life insurance is not like other property
since the essence of a purchase of life insurance is the receipt of benefits after the
death of the insured; life insurance is thus by its nature a will substitute. This was
the theory advanced by a minority of the members of the House Ways and Means
Committee in the debate over the 1954 enactment. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. B14 (1954). However, the rejection of this theory by Congress is evidenced
by the section that was eventually adopted, since that section subjects life insurance
to estate taxation only in certain specific circumstances.
The Second Circuit's theory that other sections may aid in construction of
section 2042(2) seems to be basically sound. Since section 2042 is designed to foreclose another means of estate tax avoidance [see note 7 supra], it seems reasonable
to conclude that it should be construed in a manner which will best make it fit the
general tax pattern.
26. 72-2 U.S. TAX CAS.

12,893, at 8599.
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The federal estate tax is imposed on the privilege of transferring
property at death. Adopted in 1916,27 the tax initially had as its basic
plan the inclusion in the decedent's gross estate of any property he
transferred at death. 2s However, this tax could be easily avoided by
transferring the property before death. Technically the transfer would
not be testamentary, but the decedent, by retaining interests in or control over the property after the transfer, would have all the advantages
of disposing of the property by will since he could postpone possession
or enjoyment by the transferees until his death.
Today, certain sections of the Code specifically tax these types
of transfers as substitutes for testamentary dispositions. 29 For example,
under section 204030 property owned by decedent and another as joint
tenants with a right of survivorship is fully taxed to the estate of the
deceased joint tenant if he supplied the consideration for the property.
Even though there is no "transfer" to the surviving joint tenant, this
section taxes as a substitute for a testamentary disposition the increased
right of possession or enjoyment which passes to the surviving tenant
as a result of the death of the decedent."1 Similarly, section 20352
taxes property in which the decedent has given up all interest and
control to another person by inter vivos transfer in contemplation of
death. Although there is no transfer at death, the section is applied
27. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-12, 39 Stat. 777 (now INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, §§ 2001-2209). The Act was held to be constitutional in New York Trust Co.
v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
28. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2033 now taxes transfers at death.
29. There were many early constitutional objections to Congress applying a tax
to an inter vivos transfer. One argument was that when the estate tax was applied to
an inter vivos transfer, it was a direct tax and must be apportioned. Another line of
reasoning urged that such a tax violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See United States v. Manufacturer's Nat'l Bank, 363 U.S. 194 (1960) ; Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938).
30. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2040 provides that: "the value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein held as joint
tenants by the decedent and any other person . ..."
31. See generally C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXES
§§ 11.1, 11.2 (2d ed. 1962).
32. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035 states:
(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer . . . in contemplation of his death.
(b) If the decedent within a period of 3 years ending with the date of his
death . . . transferred an interest in property, relinquished a power, or
exercised or released a general power of appointment, such transfer,
relinquishment, exercise or release shall, unless shown to the contrary,
be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death . ..
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to transfers made within three years prior to the decedent's death in
order to include within the scope of the estate tax transfers for which
the decedent had a "testamentary motive." 3 Since these transfers are
substitutes for a will, the estate tax is applied. 34 Exactly what Congress intended to achieve in the overall estate tax picture by enacting
section 2042(2) can best be determined by comparing the language
of that section to the use of similar language in other sections of the
Code.
Two of the estate tax sections specifically require that the decedent
retain an interest in the transferred property before taxation will result. For purposes of inclusion of property in the gross estate by reason of section 2036 the decedent must retain for life the right to income
from property he transfers, or the right to designate the persons who
shall possess or enjoy the income."
Similarly, section 2037 taxes a
transfer whereby possession or enjoyment of the property can be obtained by the transferee only by his surviving the decedent-transferor.
Here too it is specifically provided that as a prerequisite for inclusion
under this section the transferor must retain a reversionary interest in
the transferred property. 6
33. See generally C.

LOWNDES

& R.

KRAMER,

supra note 31, §§ 5.1-.5.

34. See Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
What the courts recognize as transfers for the purpose of the estate tax are
not necessarily limited to transfers under property concepts. Examples of taxable
"transfers" include the lapse of a power to revoke a trust [Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929)] and the lapse of a power to change the beneficiary
under an insurance policy [Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929)].
35. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2036 states:
(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer . . . under which he has retained for his life or for any
period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from,
the property, or
(2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or
the income therefrom.
36. INT. REV.CODE Of 1954, § 2037 provides in part:
(a) General Rule - The value of the gross estate shall include the value
of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent . . . made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise if-

(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership
of such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property . . . and the value of such reversionary interest immediately
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Since Congress specifically used the word "retained" in these two
sections, the Second Circuit's reasoning in Skifter that in order for section 2042 (2) to apply the decedent's powers must be retained is subject
to criticism. Unlike sections 2036 and 2037, section 2042(2) requires
inclusion where "the decedent possessed at his death" incidents of
ownership. It seems probable that if Congress had meant to tax only
the retention of powers it would have used the word "retain" instead
of "possess"; the forerunners of sections 2036 and 2037, which required retention, were in existence before the incidents of ownership
test was placed in the Code.37 By choosing the word "possess" Congress must have intended to broaden the scope of the insurance section.
Since retention was not expressly required in section 2042(2),
it is likely that this section was patterned upon the predecessor section
to section 2038,38 which required only that the enjoyment of the property transferred by the decedent be subject at the date of his death
to change through the exercise of a power to alter, amend or revoke.
The theory that retention is not required where the literal language
of the statute does not call for retention was first tested in White v.
Poor.9 In that case the settlor created a trust which could be terminated by the joint action of three trustees, one of whom was the settlor.
She resigned, and a successor trustee was chosen. At a later time
before the death of the decedent exceeds 5 percent of the value
of such property.
(b) Special Rules - For purposes of this section, the term "reversionary interest" includes a possibility that the property transferred by decedent(1) may return to him or his estate, or
(2) may be subject to a power of disposition by him. (emphasis
added).
37. The "incidents of ownership" test was placed in the insurance section in 1942.
See notes 10 & 11 supra and accompanying text. The forerunners of sections 2036 and
2037 were contained in the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 [see Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 811(c)] and had been in effect in some form since 1916. See 2 J. MERTENS, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 20.01 (1959).
38. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(d), 44 Stat. 71 [hereinafter cited as
Revenue Act of 1926], as amended INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 2038(a) (1), which, for
transfers after June 22, 1936, includes in the decedent's estate the value of all property:
To the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time
made a transfer . . . by trust or otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was
subject at the date of his death to any change through the exercise of a power
(in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in
conjunction with any other person (without regard to when or from what source
the decedent acquired such power), to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or
where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death.
(emphasis added).
39. 296 U.S. 98 (1935).
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this trustee resigned and the other trustees reappointed the settlor.
The Supreme Court held that the settlor's power to terminate, possessed by her at death, was a result of her appointment by the remaining trustees and not a power which she had reserved to herself in the
trust instrument, and that no taxation should result. The Court thus
interpreted the language of the section as requiring retention of a
power. This decision prompted Congress to enact in its next session
an amended version of the section which provided for inclusion of
property subject to a power "in whatever capacity [the power was]
exercisable," and "without regard to when or from what source
decedent acquired such a power.""'
The inference which may be
drawn from this specific congressional response is that where no retention is required by a section, possession rather than retention is
intended to cause taxation.
Not only does the language of section 2038 seem to require
taxation where the decedent possesses qualifying powers regardless
of whether they were retained in connection with a transfer, but section 2038 seems directed toward taxation of any power which may
affect the beneficial ownership of property, rather than only those
powers which the decedent may use to benefit himself economically.
Section 2038(a) (1) requires taxation of all interests transferred by
the decedent whose enjoyment by the transferee is subject to any
change through the excercise of a power to alter, amend, revoke or
terminate.4 The Treasury regulations interpret the section as applicable "to any power affecting the time or manner of enjoyment of property or its income, even though the identity of the beneficiary is not
affected." 42 The Supreme Court has also applied the section to powers
through which the donor has retained control over the economic benefits
transferred, even though he could not benefit himself.43 Thus there
40. Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 805, 49 Stat. 1744.
41. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2038(a) (1) states:
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property . . . [t]o the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer . . . where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of his death
to any change through the exercise of a power (in whatever capacity exercisable) by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with any other
person (without regard to when or from what source the decedent acquired such
power) to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death.
42. Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1(a), T.D. 6600, 1962-1 CuM. BULL. 169.
43. See Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953). In that case the decedent
transferred property to a trust for the benefit of his children, and retained as trustee
the powers to accumulate the income and to distribute corpus to the beneficiaries.
The Court held that the decedent's control over the property rendered it subject to
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seems to be no greater merit to an argument that section 2038 is concerned with whether powers are beneficial than there is to the theory
44
that the section requires retention.
Nevertheless the Second Circuit found that non-beneficial power
over property would not be taxed under section 2038 unless it was retained by the decedent. The court responded to the congressional
change in the language of the section by stating that the section "has not
been applied when the power possessed by decedent was created and conferred on him by someone else long after he had divested himself of all
interest in the property subject to the power. '45 Thus the court, finding that section 2038 would not have reached the Skifter situation had
the insurance been ordinary property, concluded that the tax pattern
required that section 2042(2) not be applicable.
The court's theory is subject to sharp criticism; it is difficult to see
how the fact that no case could be found applying section 2038 to this
type of situation provides any support for the theory that it should not
be so applied, at least in the absence of any case even considering the
argument. It is a theory which is especially difficult to maintain in
light of the specific congressional response to White v. Poor; Congress
emphatically rejected a judicial attempt to limit the broad scope of section 2038. Regardless of the merit of the court's argument that no
testamentary disposition is involved where the powers are not retained,
the theory of section 2038 seems to be that control over the economic
taxation under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(d), the predecessor of INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2038.
44. Sections 2036 and 2037 also apply regardless of whether decedent's power
could be exercised so as to benefit himself. Section 2036(a) (2) deals with powers
to designate who shall possess or enjoy the property transferred by decedent. Under
this section a decedent who has the power to shift income between an income beneficiary and a remainderman will be held to have a taxable power even though he
could not benefit himself, since he is able to determine who among the potential takers
will possess or enjoy the income. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b) (3), T.D. 6501.
1960-2 Cum. BuLL. 271. See also C. LOWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 31, § 8.19,
at 156. Similarly, under section 2037 the reversionary interest which decedent must
retain is defined to include powers of disposition which are not necessarily beneficial
to the decedent. C. LoWNDES & R. KRAMER, supra note 31, § 7.5, at 108-09. See also
Morristown Trust Co. v. Manning, 104 F. Supp. 621, aff'd, 200 F.2d 194 (3d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953) ; Estate of Elizabeth D. Hill, 23 T.C. 588,
aff'd, 229 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1956).
Although these sections provide support for the theory that no power to
benefit oneself is necessary under the general tax pattern, they would not reach a
case such as Skifter since both sections expressly require retention of the powers.
See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
45. 72-2 U.S. TAX CAS.
12,893, at 8601, The court limited the 1936 amendment to the situation where powers originally possessed by the decedent were given
away and then reconferred upon him. Id.
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benefits of property by a person who has at one time owned the property is sufficiently testamentary to cause taxation, regardless of where
46
he obtained this control.
The statutory scheme would therefore seem to provide support
for the conclusion that 2042(2) should be construed so as to tax the
insurance proceeds in Skifter. The arrangement in Skifter is a testamentary disposition of the type that the tax pattern is designed to
reach. Despite the fact that this transaction was not a will substitute
in the sense of an intentional device to retain the benefits of ownership
of the property until death, the discretionary control over the enjoyment of property possessed by the decedent until his death was testamentary; because of Skifter's powers the interests of the beneficiaries
were subject to change until his death.
DECEDENT

As A

FIDUCIARY

Another element in the Skifter court's decision was the fact that
the decedent's powers were held in his capacity as trustee, and thus
were fiduciary powers exercisable only for the benefit of others. The
Second Circuit's conclusion was similar to the reasoning used by
the Sixth Circuit in its recent decision in Estate of Fruehauf v. Commissioner.47 In that case, decedent's wife had purchased life insurance on her husband's life and named herself and her children as
beneficiaries. The wife kept control of the policies and paid all the
premiums until her death. In her will, decedent was named income
beneficiary of the policies, which were placed in trust. Decedent was
further named as one of the co-trustees who were given powers to
sell, assign or surrender the policies as well as to cause themselves
to be designated beneficiaries. 48 While the Sixth Circuit found that
the decedent possessed taxable incidents of ownership because the
decedent as trustee could have exercised the powers in a manner to
benefit himself as income beneficiary, the court rejected the theory
that mere possesson of incidents of ownership invariably requires
inclusion in the decedent's gross estate, especially when, as trustee,
49
he has the duty to act for the benefit of others.
46. See Rev. Rul. 70-348, 1970-2 Cum. BULL. 193, holding that INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2038 applied to securities transferred by the decedent to his minor children
under the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act which were held by him as successor custodian
at the time of his death.
47. 427 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'g 50 T.C. 915 (1968).
48. The Commissioner ruled that these powers constituted "incidents of ownership" under INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2042.
49. 427 F.2d at 85.
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The court of appeals in Fruehauf based its conclusion on the
earlier tax court cases of Estate of Newcomb Carlton"° and Estate
of Bert L. Fuchs,5x both of which had held that insurance proceeds
were not includible in an insured-decedent's gross estate when the
only powers he had over the policies were required to be exercised
in a fiduciary capacity or for the benefit of another. In Carlton, decedent created an inter vivos trust into which he placed life insurance policies on his life and securities with which to pay the premiums
on the policies. He originally possessed certain powers over the policies
but by subsequent instruments relinquished all rights except the right
to income in excess of that necessary to pay the premiums on the
policies and the right to appoint a co-trustee, including himself, for
a co-trustee who had resigned. The trustees had broad powers to
deal with the policies.52 But for the fact that at the time of his
death the powers he retained were unexercised, decedent could have
had powers equal to "incidents of ownership." However, the Tax
Court determined that even if the insured had exercised his right to
appoint himself trustee, his control over the policies would have been
exercised jointly with the other trustee and, so applied, could only
benefit the trust and not himself.5" Although the case was reversed on
other grounds, 54 the Tax Court's opinion in this respect was approved,
intimating that such control in the limited capacity as trustee would
not constitute taxable incidents of ownership in the decedent.5"
In Fuchs, the Tax Court was faced with a situation in which two
partners had taken out reciprocal life insurance policies to fund a buy50. 34 T.C. 988 (1960), rev'd on other grounds, 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).

51. 47 T.C. 199 (1966).
52. The trustees had the power to receive premium payments on the policies,
surrender a policy for its cash value, obtain loans and invest and reinvest the principal
of the trust in their discretion. 34 T.C. at 990.
53. Id. at 996.
54. 298 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1962).
55. Judge Medina in a concurring opinion apparently approved the Tax Court's
opinion regarding incidents of ownership, intimating that control as trustee would not
cause inclusion in the gross estate, when he stated:
In the paragraph wherein the grantor stated his intention to part with, and
transfer to the trustees, all rights to the insurance policies, the right to surrender
them for their cash surrender values and the right to obtain loans on them are
listed; however, these rights could of course be exercised only as directed by the
grantor elsewhere in the trust instrument and in conformity with the purpose and
intent of the trust. In other words, subject to the primary and clearly implied
direction that the policies be preserved for and the proceeds paid to the grantor's
son, the beneficiary.
Id. at 420.
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sell agreement. Although they intended each policy to be owned by
the partner who was named as beneficiary and not by the insured
partner, several powers, including the right to change the beneficiary,
were left with the insured by mistake. The court emphasized that, regardless of what the policy said, each insured was under a legal duty
to respect the terms of the partnership agreement, which, as a practical
matter, prevented any action by the insured contrary to the parties'
original intent. Although the case did not involve a trust, the court
drew an analogy between the insured's position in that case and that
of a common trustee obligated to respect the terms of the instrument
granting him power, observing, "decedent merely had the same type
of power over the . . .policies as a trustee's power to affect trust
proceeds. We do not believe this type of naked power alone is sufficient to bring the insurance proceeds within decedent's gross estate." 6
The results in these cases to some extent turn upon the rationale
that decedent does not possess taxable incidents of ownership if he
is not able to benefit himself through the exercise of his powers. However, there is also a slightly different element involved in these decisions; particularly in Fuchs, the theory is developed that powers
which might otherwise constitute incidents of ownership will not be
taxed where they are exercisable by the decedent only in a fiduciary
capacity. The basis for this argument seems to be that the power of a
fiduciary is not as great as the power would be if held by another
since a fiduciary is answerable for his actions in a court of equity.r
The theory that the fiduciary nature of the powers itself prevents taxation is somewhat faulty. The Treasury regulations interpreting section 2042 specifically state that it is irrelevant whether or
58
not the decedent's powers are exercisable in his capacity as a trustee.
These regulations paraphrase what is accepted doctrine under the
other sections of the estate tax. 59 The mere fact that a power is
fiduciary has no appreciable effect upon the scope of the power, par56. 47 T.C. at 204. See also National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 87
F. Supp. 773 (Ct. Cl. 1950). In that case a son had taken out insurance on his
mother's life and the policies reserved the usual rights and powers to the mother as
the insured. Included among these powers was the right to change beneficiaries.
However, since it was understood by the parties that the policies belonged to the son,
the court refused to apply the estate tax at the mother's death, reasoning that she
would never have tried to exercise any of the reserved rights to benefit herself.
57. See In re Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 97 N.E.2d 888 (1951) ; Skinnell v. Mahoney,
197 App. Div. 808, 189 N.Y.S. 845 (1921).
58. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(c) (4) (1958).
59. See, e.g., Estate of Albert E. Nettleton, 4 T.C. 987 (1945), acquiesced in,
1946-1 Cum. BULL. 3; Treas. Reg. § 20.2038-1 (a) (i), T.D. 6600, 1962-1 Cum.
BULL. 169.
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ticularly in cases which involve family situations or powers that are
stated to be discretionary by the instrument which confers them.6"
A different theory is the doctrine that fiduciary powers the exercise of which is controlled by an ascertainable standard are not taxable. The courts have developed the theory under the other estate
tax sections that a power which would otherwise be within the scope
of the Code will not be taxed where it may be exercised only in accordance with a definite and ascertainable standard which will be enforced by a court of equity. 1 The reasoning is that there is no discretionary control where the actions of the holder of the power are
62
limited by an external standard which can be enforced against him.
There is no persuasive argument against applying this doctrine
in the insurance area. Where the decedent's actions can be controlled
by those whose interests they affect, his power seems to be too insubstantial to be termed an incident of ownership. Moreover, since many of the
concepts of section 2042 are taken from the other estate tax sections, 63
there is logical force to the argument that the ascertainable standard doctrine should also be carried over into the taxation of insurance.
However, even if this doctrine is applicable to insurance, it should
not prevent taxation in the Skifter situation. Although by the terms
of the trust Mrs. Skifter indicated that the income beneficiary should
be favored, the decedent was authorized in his complete discretion to
distribute all or any part of the principal of the trust to the income
beneficiaries, to retain, sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise dispose of
the property,64 and in general to exercise all rights and powers as if
he were the absolute owner of the policies.6 5 The terms of the trust
expressly exonerated the decedent from the application of any rules
of trust law which would require him to act impartially as between
60. The terms of the instrument creating the fiduciary's powers can authorize him
to do that which, in the absence of such provisions, would be a breach of the fiduciary's
duties. 2 H. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 170.9-.10 (3d ed. 1967). In addition, in
the family situation, additional power may be given to the decedent by factors outside
of the trust instrument.
61. See Comment, The Doctrine of External Standards Under Sections 2036(a)(2) and 2038, 52 MINN. L. REv. 1071 (1968).
62. Id. at 1079.
63. See notes 36-40 supra and accompanying text.
64. See note 3 supra.
65. Part of Mrs. Skifter's will provided:
Six: A ....
I authorize my Executor and also my Trustee, as the case may be,
in his absolute discretion, with respect to any property, real or personal, ...
generally to exercise all such rights and powers and to do all such acts as I might
do with respect to such property if I were living and the absolute owner thereof.
56 T.C. at 1192.
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income beneficiaries and remaindermen. 6 Because of these provisions,
the decedent's power was not subject to a standard that a beneficiary
could enforce in a court of equity. Therefore the fact that Skifter was
a trustee should have had no effect on taxation of the insurance policies
on his life.
CONCLUSION

Although the Skifter decision at first glance seems to provide a
favorable result for taxpayers, the confusion which is inherent in the
distinctions drawn by the court is less heartening. The holding that
non-beneficial, non-retained powers are the point at which the line
between taxability and non-taxability will be placed introduces further
technicality into a section which is already complex. In addition, the
fact that the court's reading of the statute is ill-founded means that the
case might be dangerous precedent upon which to rely in future controversies; it also indicates that perhaps further congressional action
to clarify this area of the estate tax is needed. Despite the result
reached in Skifter, it seems that placing the decedent as trustee of a
trust which contains insurance policies on his life is not careful tax
planning.
66. See note 3 supra.

